Wykład gościnny "Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra on the Reliability of Yogic Perception" Prof. Shinya Moriyama (Shinshu University, Japonia)

Serdecznie zapraszamy na wykład gościnny "Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra on the Reliability of Yogic Perception", który wygłosi Profesor Shinya Moriyama ​z Shinshu University w Japonii. Wykład odbędzie się 15 listopada 2019 roku w godzinach 13.00-14.00 (wykład z dyskusją) w sali 118 ​w Katedrze Porównawczych Studiów Cywilizacji.

​Abstrakt wystąpienia:

As is well known, according to Dharmakīrti’s view, the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) is classified into only two types, namely, perception, which is a non-conceptual cognition, and inference, a kind of conceptual cognition. Of the two, the former is further divided into four types, namely, sensory perception (indriyapratyakṣa), mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), self-awareness (svasaṃvedana), and yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa). Of the four, yogic perception takes a specific position because of its religious role in Buddhist epistemological tradition, which has originally arisen from Yogācāra tradition, namely, a Buddhist group who were engaged in Buddhist yoga practice. Thus, whereas this type of perception holds as its important background the Buddhist theory of meditative practice, its analysis is done within the framework of Buddhist epistemology that searches for the ground of the validity or reliability of cognition.

This presentation will deal with the reliability of yogic perception, especially focusing on the interpretation of a phrase pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi in Pramāṇavārttika III 286a, to which Eli Franco has suggested another reading pramāṇasaṃvādi. In my view, this Franco’s reading is untenable not only in comparison with Dharmakīrti’s explanation in the Pramāṇaviniścaya but also with other materials, including Prajñākaragupta’s commentary and Jñānaśrīmitra’s Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa. Yet, it does not imply that Franco’s suggestion is completely meaningless. Rather, what he called our attentions to the difference between pramāṇasaṃvādi and saṃvādi invites us to examine a more fundamental problem of yogic perception: How is the reliability (avisaṃvāditva) of yogic perception justified? In other words, it should be asked whether the agreement with ordinary means of valid cognition (pramāṇasaṃvāditva) is really unrelated to the justification of the reliability of yogic perception. In the first part of this presentation, I will discuss on Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of PV III 286, and in the second part, turning to Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument relevant to the issue.

Wszystkich zainteresowanych zachęcamy do uczestnictwa w wykładzie!
 

Published Date: 05.11.2019
Published by: Krystyna Mierzwa